Fighting for Family: French Kin Networks and the American Revolution in the Illinois Country, 1780-1781 by Stuckey, Steven Philip
University of Missouri, St. Louis
IRL @ UMSL
Theses Graduate Works
6-23-2010
Fighting for Family: French Kin Networks and the
American Revolution in the Illinois Country,
1780-1781
Steven Philip Stuckey
University of Missouri-St. Louis, spstuckey@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an
authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stuckey, Steven Philip, "Fighting for Family: French Kin Networks and the American Revolution in the Illinois Country, 1780-1781"
(2010). Theses. 169.
http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/169
  
 
 
 
 
Fighting for Family: French Kin Networks and the 
American Revolution in the Illinois Country, 1780-1781 
 
 
 
Steven P. Stuckey 
M.A., History, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2010 
B.A., History, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007 
 
 
 
A Thesis submitted to The Graduate School at the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the 
degree Master of Arts in History 
 
 
August 2010 
 
 
 
Advisory Committee 
 
  J. Frederick Fausz, Ph.D. 
Chairperson 
 
Peter J. Acsay, Ph. D. 
 
Robert J. Moore, Jr., Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Copyright, Steven P. Stuckey, 2010 
 
 
Thesis Abstract 
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Steven P. Stuckey 
“Fighting for Family: French Kin Networks and the American 
Revolution in the Illinois Country, 1780-1781” 
M.A. Thesis, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2010 
 
―Fighting for Family‖ exposes an often overlooked and incomplete 
history behind the Battle of St. Louis in 1780, and the retaliatory raids on 
Fort St. Joseph in 1780-1781.  Scholars have long interpreted these events as 
minor skirmishes of the American Revolution, or focused on Spain’s motives 
in trying to lay claim to the Great Lakes in postwar treaty negotiations. 
However, this thesis adds a crucial new perspective regarding those 
events.  Utilizing genealogical records and personal correspondences, 
―Fighting for Family‖ argues that the vitality of French kin networks in the 
Illinois Country, which included members of key Indian nations, played a 
more compelling role than previously acknowledged.  The French familial ties 
between the inhabitants of the Mississippi River Valley and Lake Michigan 
region defied British policies, eroded their trade, confounded their military 
maneuvers, and ultimately ruined British efforts to dominate the West in the 
late stages of the American Revolution.  Drawing on connections between 
family members around Fort St. Joseph and those in St. Louis, ―Fighting for 
Family‖ proves that the widely-dispersed residents of French descent–people 
without a country–used family ties to impact political events on their frontier 
in the 1780s.
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Introduction 
 
 For the past 235 years, the creation story of the United States has 
remained a romantic epic of abused English colonists declaring their freedom 
from the ―absolute Tyranny‖ of the British Empire.1  Popular history 
continues to praise the roles of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and 
Benjamin Franklin as national icons, while memorializing the many bloody 
battle sites on the East Coast as sacred ground.  But by emphasizing the 
trials and tribulations of the American colonists along the Atlantic seaboard, 
historians have obscured revolutionary events elsewhere—especially the 
long-ignored war in the West.  
This thesis will concentrate on the little-known campaigns in the 
Illinois Country—specifically the British-led Indian attack on the French 
citizens of Spanish St. Louis in May 1780 and the retaliatory raids of St. 
Louisans and their Indian allies against Britain’s Fort St. Joseph near 
present-day Niles, Michigan in late 1780 and early 1781.  Those battles on 
the western frontier reveal the vital role of Indian participation in the 
decisions of dependent Europeans; provide more of a global context to the 
American Revolution, in which Spanish participation has been ignored; and, 
above all, demonstrate the significance of kin connections among the French 
living in all parts of the Illinois Country.2   
                                                 
1
 Declaration of Independence, final draft, July 2, 1776, adopted by Congress on July 4. 
2
 For the remainder of this thesis, the term “Illinois country” will encompass the Mississippi River Valley, 
eastern Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, southern Wisconsin, and southern Michigan. 
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Recent scholarship has begun to address the neglect of that last point, 
but most historians still overlook the extensive genealogical connections 
between the French families of St. Louis and Fort St. Joseph, which were far 
better indicators of loyalty and predictable behavior than the foreign flags of 
Spain and Great Britain that flew above those francophone towns.  I will 
argue that the ―hidden history‖ of French kinship networks, which linked the 
Mississippi River Valley and Lake Michigan region, defied British policies, 
eroded their trade, confounded their military maneuvers, and ultimately 
ruined English efforts to dominate the West in the late stages of the 
American Revolution. 
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Chapter1 
 
Background to Revolution in the Illinois Country 
 
 The Illinois Country experienced revolution roughly a dozen years 
before shots were fired at Lexington and Concord in 1775.  At the end of the 
French and Indian War in 1763, France’s North American empire was 
dismantled, with Great Britain claiming Canada and the entire trans-
Appalachian region.  British America’s new western borders included the old 
French Creole villages along the Mississippi River in present-day Illinois.  To 
ensure that England did not gain control of the trans-Mississippi West (what 
the Americans would later call the Louisiana Purchase Territory), France 
ceded the rest of the traditional Illinois Country (le pays des Illinois) to its 
Bourbon ally, Spain, in the 1762 Treaty of Fontainebleau.3  Despite that 
move, Britain still doubled the size of its North American possessions and 
gained an abundance of commercial resources in the process.   
Although the European diplomats who met in Paris to redraw the 
international boundaries of North America did not consider the Illinois 
Country as valuable as either Canada or the Caribbean islands, that region 
had long been an integral part of the French Empire in the New World. Lying 
between the fur-rich Great Lakes and the plantations of the Gulf of Mexico, 
French Illinois was a north-south connecting point along the Mississippi 
                                                 
3
 France’s territorial claims in North America were called New France, and the Treaty of Fontainebleau 
served as a defense measure against the expansion of British power, but also as a reward to Spain for their 
efforts and losses in Europe during the Seven Years War.  Treaty of Paris 1763, Art. IV, XX; Carl J. 
Ekberg, Francois Valle and His World: Upper Louisiana Before Lewis and Clark (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2002), 17. 
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River, serving as the bread basket of New Orleans, with its grain exports 
complementing a mixed economy of fur trading, lead mining, and salt 
manufacturing.  Founded between 1699-1730, the Illinois villages of Cahokia, 
Kaskaskia, Fort de Chartres, St. Philippe, and Prairie du Rocher featured 
dual settlement with the Algonquian tribes of Tamoroa, Cahokia, Kaskaskia, 
Metchigamea, and Peoria Indians—a model of multicultural cooperation in a 
common pursuit of cultivation, commerce, and conversion rarely achieved in 
the later British Empire.  Between 1732-1752, French Illinois enjoyed its best 
years, with large wheat exports increasing the value of rich riverine fields 
from 10.8 livres to 14.4 livres per arpent.4  In those same decades, the French 
fur trade also expanded at St. Joseph, Green Bay, Michilimackinac, and 
smaller posts throughout the western Great Lakes north of Illinois, with   
2,000 horse packs in 1730 increasing to 2,250 by 1757.5 
 Whether through permanent cohabitation with farming Indians along 
the Mississippi or by frequent visitation of Indian hunting grounds in the rest 
of le pays des Illinois, the French were the first (often only) Europeans to 
respect ―Native Ground‖ in pursuing their agricultural and commercial goals.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Livres were the Spanish currency during the 18
th
 century, while arpents were measurements for plots of 
land.  Ekberg, Francois Valle, 12, 15. 
5
 Horse pack was the term used to quantify the amount of goods being traded, and was standardized 
throughout the Illinois Country.   Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in 
the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 123. 
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They quickly realized that, as outnumbered outsiders, they had to deal with 
dominant Indian populations on a ―Middle Ground‖ of mutual negotiation in 
order to enjoy peace and prosperity along distant frontiers. The Canadian 
government had initially restricted licensed French fur traders to two canoes 
in the hinterland, thus limiting the amount of goods and personal items they 
could carry.  As a result, those French frontiersmen developed a dependency 
on Indians for food and shelter, while Indians valued European imported 
merchandise even more because of its scarcity.  Diplomatic reciprocity—
French gifts of practical, or symbolically significant, items in exchange for 
Indian sustenance and military support—resonated with Native cultural 
patterns and allowed the fur trade to flourish as a mutually desirable 
enterprise.  The development of later trading towns and forts near major 
waterways encouraged more prolonged and necessary multiethnic 
interaction.   Over many generations, French and Indian peoples merged 
their worlds into hybrid creations through cross-cultural marriages and métis 
bloodlines, thus placing a heavy emphasis on multiethnic kin networks for 
both social stability and economic security.6 
  
                                                 
6
 Kathleen Du Val, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: 
University of Philadelphia Press, 2006), 3-12; Tanis C. Thorne, The Many Hands of My Relations: French 
and Indians on the Lower Missouri (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996), 65; Susan Sleeper-
Smith, “Furs and Female Kin Networks: The World of Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque Chevalier,” 
in Jo-Anne Fiske, Susan Sleeper-Smith, and William Wicken, ed., New Faces of the Fur Trade: Selected 
Papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995 (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University, 1998), 53, 56-57;  Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: 
Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
2001), 41; Daniel Usner, Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower 
Mississippi Valley Before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 26. 
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When Great Britain seized control of that multicultural landscape, its 
expectations of a fur trade bonanza were shattered by an immediate and 
violent reaction from France’s long-term Indian allies.  In what became 
known as Pontiac’s war, uprising, or ―conspiracy,‖ an Ottawa leader of that 
name demonstrated that a few hundred Indian warriors from several 
Algonquian nations could thwart the plans of the mighty British Empire.  
Although Pontiac sacked all the forts with the exception of Niagara, Detroit, 
and Fort Pitt, his uprising lost steam, and by 1765, the British army regained 
complete control.7   
Pontiac’s bloody campaigns made British officials realize that their 
power, Protestantism, and arrogant behavior toward many Indians had   
alienated old French settlers and their Native allies.  The Proclamation Line 
of October 1763, which prohibited Anglo-American colonists from encroaching 
on Indian territory beyond the Appalachians, was a step in the right 
direction.  But how was Britain going to reap the benefits of a vast fur 
frontier so suffused with hybrid cultural traditions of the long-term French 
and Indian partnerships?  The Board of Trade in London drafted a new 
policy– the (Sir William) ―Johnson Plan‖–to implement in the Illinois 
Country.  To minimize the risk of attacks upon vulnerable British traders 
and forts on distant frontiers, Indians were now required to travel to the 
major bases at Michilimackinac and Detroit to trade their peltries.  Though 
this new policy had long been the practice in the East, Indians in the Illinois 
                                                 
7
 White, The Middle Ground, 269-314. 
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Country were not accustomed to traveling long distances to trade their furs.  
Rather, the French traveled to their villages, which was conducive to both 
sexual and commercial intercourse.  As such, the new British policy seemed 
exclusionary and even racially prejudicial, in addition to being inconvenient.  
The dictates of bureaucrats across the sea hindered the concept of ―Middle 
Ground‖ negotiations that respected ―Native Ground‖ in furthering mutually 
desirable commerce.8 
Just across the Mississippi River, within two miles of the British 
Empire in Illinois, a new group of Frenchmen were expanding into the West.  
There, vast numbers of powerful Indian nations had a bounty of furs to trade.  
Without knowing about the 1762 cession of western Louisiana to Spain in the 
all-too-secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, the last two French governors in New 
Orleans—Louis Billouart, Chevalier de Kerlerec, and Jean Jacques Blaise 
D’Abbadie—granted a trading monopoly along the Missouri River to Gilbert 
Antoine de St. Maxent and Pierre Laclede and Company.  In December 1763, 
Laclede and 14-year old Auguste Chouteau found the ideal location for their 
fur trade enterprise near the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi 
rivers.  Then, on February 15, 1764, Chouteau’s crew of thirty workmen 
began building the first permanent French town in the West that was 
                                                 
8
 Clarence Edwin Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774 (New York: Books for 
Libraries Press, 1971), 79; Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women, 61-62. 
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entirely devoted to the Indian trade, without military or missionary motives.9 
Laclede named his new settlement St. Louis after the crusading king, Louis 
IX, patron saint of the then French king, Louis XV. 
From the outset, St. Louis was a fur trade ―Mecca,‖ attracting Indians 
such as the Missouris even before the original buildings were complete. The 
women and children of that tribe helped dig the cellar for Laclede’s own 
house and trading headquarters, which revealed not only a congenial 
relationship but also the popularity of a new center of fur commerce that was 
French rather than British.10  A host of French fur traders quickly moved 
across the river from Illinois residences near Fort de Chartres and Cahokia to 
access a booming business with equestrian Siouan hunters who had been 
starved of European merchandise during the long French and Indian War. 
This exodus from Illinois was reflected in the St. Louis census of 1772, which 
recorded ―399 whites of both sexes, and 198 slaves‖—for a total population of 
597—when only a decade earlier, all of Spanish Louisiana between the 
Arkansas and Missouri rivers had but 891 inhabitants.11   
St. Louisans succeeded in creating a safe, affluent town because they 
welcomed all friendly Native nations for trade and diplomacy, although the 
populous, powerful Osages were the essential allies who guaranteed the 
economic stability and military security of Laclede’s settlement.  They visited 
                                                 
9
 Although Maxent and Laclede’s original license was revoked in 1767, Maxent was granted a similar 
permit from Spanish Governor Antonio de Ulloa in 1768.  A.P. Nasatir, “Indian Trade and Diplomacy in 
the Spanish Illinois, 1763-1792” (PhD diss., University of California, 1926), 6-7; Thorne, Many Hands, 68. 
10
 Thorne, Many Hands, 70. 
11
 Louis Houck, A History of Missouri: From the Earliest Explorations and Settlements until the Admission 
of the State into the Union (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1908), vol. II, 29. 
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three or four times a year to trade huge quantities of deerskins, but French 
St. Louisans also entertained the Osages’ Sauk and Fox enemies because 
their maple sugar and pecans were desirable delicacies.12  
French traders conducted business their own way for nearly six years 
before the first Spanish lieutenant governor established residency in St. 
Louis.  Prior to that, in 1769, a temporary official, Francisco Rui, discovered 
that merchants ruled the town.  Many opposed Rui’s restrictions on their 
freedom of movement, sharing licenses and merchandise, trading with off-
limit tribes, and especially his prohibition against ―going on the East Side of 
the Mississippi‖ to trade with Illinois Indians now in British territory.  Even 
though the old French Creoles resented Rui’s threats to send offenders ―in 
Irons to Pensacola,‖ they were not interested in ―exciting the Savages to 
commit Disturbances‖ against Spanish rule.13 Later lieutenant governors 
proved much more lenient, and the leading French traders were usually able 
to purchase permits for conducting business almost anywhere along the lower 
Missouri River, often for years at a time.  For example, Eugene Poure, Pedro 
Montardi, and Charles Cardenal were licensed to trade exclusively with three 
                                                 
12
 Abraham Nasatir, “The Chouteaus and the Indian Trade of the West, 1764-1852,” 15, in Throne, Many 
Hands, 70. 
13
 “Regulations Made By Captain Rui to Govern the Traders on the Misouri, 1769,” in Louis Houck, ed., 
The Spanish Regime in Missouri (Chicago: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1909), vol. 1, 35; Gage to 
Hillsborough, Aug. 17, 1768, in Great Britain, Colonial Office 5, 291, in Paul Chrisler Phillips, The Fur 
Trade (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 598. 
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groups of Pawnees, which, in the right circumstances, provided long-term 
stability for St. Louis’s Indian relations.14   
Leading merchant families, such as the Laclede-Chouteaus, Cerres, 
and Gratiots shared bloodlines as well as business ties to create a strong 
oligarchy that lasted decades.  They had the family connections with both 
Europeans and Indians to undertake trade themselves or to monopolize the 
merchandise that was extended on credit to other traders, at a huge 
markup.15  Despite British and Spanish prohibitions, such dominant 
merchants controlled fur trading along both banks of the Mississippi as a 
profitable contraband industry.  Before Laclede’s death in 1778, he policed 
the west side of the Mississippi River looking for, and sometimes finding, 
illegal British traders along the Missouri.  English officials became 
increasingly upset that the Spanish officials were unable (and most of the 
time unwilling) to control the contraband trade in Illinois, while protecting 
St. Louis from interlopers.  Garrisons such as Fort de Chartres, which the 
British occupied in October 1765, proved to be too expensive, given their 
ineffectiveness in preventing contraband commerce.  An English officer there 
summarized the dilemma:  ―Inhabitants [of the Illinois Country] have 
continued to Send their Peltry to New Orleans, which is shipped from thence 
for old France, and all the Money that is laid out for the Troops and Savages, 
is immediately sent to New Orleans, for which Our Subjects get  
                                                 
14
 Poure traded with Stabaco village, Montardi with Topage village, and Cardenal with Panimaha village, 
all of which belong to the Pawnee nation.  Nasatir, “Indian Trade,” 25. 
15
 Thorne, Many Hands, 85. 
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French Manufactures; the Crown of Great Britain is at all the Expence and 
that of France reaps the Advantage.‖16 
While the British harassed French residents on the east side of the 
Mississippi River, illegal French commerce flourished on the Spanish side by 
flaunting restrictions.  The fur trade in St. Louis increased so dramatically, 
the British complained, that the majority of the peltry from ―His Majesty’s 
Dominions in America‖ was shipped through the ―Mississippi [to be] carried 
directly to Foreign Markets contrary to the Laws and Policy‖ of England.  
General Thomas Gage, commander of the British forces in North America, 
estimated that France gained some £80,000 sterling from the furs shipped 
from St. Louis and the Illinois Country.17  What was becoming apparent was 
that not even troops of the great British Empire could prevent traditional ties 
of local French and Indian kinship from determining the nature of trade 
relationships.  French merchants such as Joseph Roy and Nicollas 
Marchesseau utilized their families’ intercultural connections with Indians 
on both the British and Spanish sides of the Mississippi to obtain trade goods 
as much as ―30% cheaper.‖  And the French connection with Spanish New 
Orleans provided the opportunity to ship their peltries there, where peltries 
―bore prices ten pence per pound higher than any British market.‖18 
According to a British official in 1773, ―as long as the Commodities of the 
                                                 
16
 Capt. Forbes, Fort de Chartres, Apr. 15, 1768, in G.B. CO5, 86/301.  Forbes again wrote on Jan.1, 1769: 
“…more French than English manufacturers were consumed in the Illinois.” G.B. CO5, 87/67, in Phillips, 
Fur Trade, 598. 
17
 Capt. Forbes to Gage, Jan., 1769, in G.B. CO5, 72/237; Gage to Shelburne, Jan. 17, 1767, in G.B. CO5, 
84/54, in Phillips, Fur Trade, 600. 
18
 Thorne, Many Hands, 86-87. 
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Mississippi bear a better Price at New Orleans than at a British Market; and 
that the Merchants of that Place can contrive to Sell their Goods at lower 
Rates than the British Traders,‖ then the fur trade ―tended more to the 
Benefit of New Orleans than of Ourselves.‖19 
Between 1763-1768, England lost approximately £9,144 sterling due to 
the decrease in beaver exports from the American colonies, and another 
estimate claimed that the British lost revenue from 500 to 1,000 packs of fur 
annually from the Illinois Country alone.  By 1770 it was apparent to London 
officials that the ―Johnson Plan‖ had created an economic nightmare for 
British traders, who risked their livelihoods by not visiting Indian villages 
and risked their lives if they pursued illegal commerce too far from the 
protection of forts.  After four years, the old policy was abandoned, but the 
damage to Indian goodwill and trader confidence would be hard to redeem.  
In its place, British officials required traders to apply for restrictive licenses 
from fort commissaries and to pay a bond to guarantee compliance with strict 
trading regulations.  In addition, traders had to charge fixed prices for goods, 
which caused many to seek higher profits in contraband trade with the 
French, even if England’s economy suffered.20   
By 1770, the British fur trade in the Illinois Country was in dire 
straits, because London had alienated both Indians and their own merchants 
                                                 
19
 Gage to Dartmouth, May 5, 1773, in G.B. CO5, 90/290, in Phillips, Fur Trade, 601; Carter, Great 
Britain, 77-102, in Thorne, Many Hands, 71. 
20
 Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women, 62-63; Carter, Great Britain, 94; Carter calculated the annual value of 
furs exported from the colonies to Great Britain alone as follows: 
1764 - £28,067 1765 - £27,801  1766 - £24,654 1767 - £20,262 1768 - £18,923 
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with over-regulation, while the French prospered through their old, and still 
viable, Native alliances based on personal trust.21  Great Britain’s occupation 
of the Illinois Country had failed to win the hearts and minds of the French 
and Indians, and English officials on both sides of the Atlantic grappled with 
increasing frontier crises in addition to trade issues.22  Some English traders 
had intentionally addicted Indians to alcohol in order to cheat them out of 
their lands as well as pelts.  English colonists in the South had breeched the 
Proclamation Line of 1763, and their invasions of Indian territories led to the 
extermination of valuable animals for both Native subsistence and trade.  
But they remained as permanent and defiant squatters on tribal homelands, 
which further enraged populous tribes.  Since the British government had 
trimmed the budget, frontier officials were scarce, only able to patrol ―Lakes  
and Waters of Communication,‖ while leaving the rest of the land open for 
whites who sought free farms without the legalities or expense.23  
Violent Indian retaliations and recurring frontier vigilantism 
inevitably followed. Between 1773-1774, Creeks and Cherokees in the South 
killed many white ―squatters;‖ Potawatomies in the North murdered several 
―thieving‖ traders; and the Shawnees and other Native nations along the 
Ohio River fought pitched battles with Virginia frontiersmen in Lord 
Dunmore’s War.24  When the British tried to collect the £9,000 needed to 
                                                 
21
 Hillsborough to Gage, Feb., 1770, in G.B. CO5, 88/95, in Phillips, Fur Trade, 601-602. 
22
 Usner, Indians, Settlers, and Slaves, 4. 
23
 Phillips, Fur Trade, 611-622. 
24
 Phillips, Fur Trade, 622. 
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provide for additional frontier defense, outraged colonial governments 
refused pay.25 ―As the Colonies do not seem disposed to concur in any general 
Regulations for that purpose [of Indian trade],‖ wrote Lord Dartmouth, ―I am 
at a loss to suggest any mode by which this important service can be other 
ways provided.‖26  General Thomas Gage proposed a military solution, calling 
for ―1,000 soldiers to the West, [to] build new and stronger posts‖ on the 
Mississippi, Illinois, Ohio, and Wabash Rivers, but there were few funds for 
that.  The idea of bribing hostile Indians with increased quantities of 
premium merchandise was also rejected as too costly.  As Gage observed, 
―Indian expences at Illinois are intolerable and they ask more than the trade 
amounts to.‖27  The ideal solution, some Londoners suggested, would be to 
conquer Spain’s entire Louisiana territory, but that was the most expensive 
proposition of all. 
The British government was in no position to provide such extensive 
military resources at an enormous cost, since the Atlantic colonists were 
already protesting increased taxes for ―imperial defense and Indian trade.‖28 
William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
conceived the Quebec Act in 1774 as a radical, but necessary, solution to the 
dangers and debts that the British had experienced in the turbulent trans-
                                                 
25
 The Northern Department required £5,000 annually, while the Southern Department required £4,000 
annually. Instructions to Botetourt, Aug. 3, 1768, in Great Britain, Colonial Office 5, 1368: 461, in Phillips, 
Fur Trade, 616, 621, 612. 
26
 Documents Relating to the Colonial History of New York, VIII, 348-349, in Phillips, Fur Trade, 621-623. 
27
 Gage to Shelburne, Mar. 12, 1768, in Great Britain, Colonial Office 5, 99, in Phillips, Fur Trade, 598-
599. 
28
 Gage to Hillsborough, November 10, 1770, P. R. O., Am. and W. I., vol. 126, Hillsborough to Gage, July 
31, 1770, P. R. O., Am. and W. I., vol. 126, in Carter, Great Britain, 101, 102. 
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Appalachian region since 1763.  That legislation turned governance of the 
entire territory over to Quebec, recognizing the defects of the Proclamation 
Line by giving the area more of a ―French feel.‖  By expanding Roman 
Catholicism and French legal traditions between the mountains and the 
Mississippi, the British acknowledged the primacy of French Quebec in 
reestablishing traditional trade relationships with the Indians.  Quebec 
merchants had no problem funding a renewed fur trade without trying to  
settle on Indian homelands, which perfectly aligned with the Crown’s goals to 
expand export profits while minimizing the expenses of a military frontier.29 
While the Quebec Act seemed to be a boom for fur traders and Indian 
hunters within and beyond the Illinois Country, it aroused the ire of powerful 
English colonies, such as Virginia, that were more interested in creating a 
settler empire in the West than in furthering the mercantilist goals of the 
mother country or catering to their old French and Indian enemies.  Colonists 
along the Atlantic coast were angered at being required to pay for frontier 
posts such as Fort de Chartres, while Canadian merchants reaped the profits. 
Would English farmers in the East, who desired to move onto cheaper lands 
in the West, really benefit from keeping suspicious Indians well armed with 
the latest trade muskets on their homelands that would block access to the 
trans-Appalachian region?  Enraged by the Quebec Act and other ―intolerable 
acts‖ passed by Parliament in 1774, the thirteen colonies convened the First 
Continental Congress and planned to boycott British imports unless the 
                                                 
29
 Phillips, Fur Trade, 625. 
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offending legislation was reversed within the year.  ―The non-importing 
Resolutions of the Merchants and Inhabitants‖ created a scarcity of Indian 
trade goods and inflated the prices for merchandise to more than 40 percent. 
But given the political, constitutional, and economic crises that caused 
colonial militiamen and British regulars to exchange lethal fire at Lexington 
and Concord, such concerns about distant frontiers seemed trivial indeed.30   
The War for American Independence in the East was the ultimate 
response to failed British policies in the West, which had imposed additional 
taxation on the thirteen seaboard colonies, limited economic opportunities, 
attacked political freedoms, and restricted the territorial expansion of their 
residents.  While the British and Continental armies warred along the 
Atlantic, two important fur trade centers in the Illinois Country—St. Louis 
and Fort St. Joseph—also became pivotal targets on ―contested grounds.‖ 
                                                 
30
 John Stuart to Botetourt, July 12, 1770, in Great Britain, Colonial Office 5, 1348:259, in Phillips, Fur 
Trade, 627. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Revolutionary Role of St. Louis, 1776-1780  
 
―What a horrible spectacle,‖ wrote Fernando de Leyba, Spanish 
lieutenant governor of St. Louis, as he recounted the bloodbath in his town to 
Governor-General Bernardo de Galvez in the Louisiana capital. ―It was an 
affliction and general consternation, to see these poor corpses cut into pieces, 
their entrails arrachez [thrown out], their limbs, heads, arms and legs 
scattered all over the field.‖  Clearly, Leyba was ―very deeply grieved with 
great pain‖ about the British attack against St. Louis on May 26, 1780.31  His 
emotional words reveal the profound significance of that event for locals, in 
contrast to the trivialization of that ―mere skirmish‖ by historians whose 
main focus was the Revolutionary War in the East. What was happening half 
a continent away, however, would eventually affect the Mississippi River 
Valley. 
 Although Great Britain remained very much invested in the western 
fur trade, the intensive military activity in the thirteen colonies necessitated 
some dramatic changes in policy.  The British rerouted frontier trade through 
Montreal and recalled the troops serving in the Illinois Country, leaving old 
Fort de Chartres empty and abandoned.  Even without troops, the English 
influenced the trade in the West because of the strategic placement of Detroit 
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and Michilimackinac in the Great Lakes region and Montreal’s access to 
them and the St. Lawrence River route to the Atlantic.  The availability of 
British goods and the Crown’s willingness to pay a premium for pelts 
reassured several western tribes, in contrast to the rebellious colonies, whose 
limited financial capabilities and shortage of imports practically ended their 
trade ties with many interior Indians.32  
With the steady flow of trade goods, British traders were able to 
maximize profits in the Illinois country.  In 1777, half of the furs exported 
from Montreal came by way of Detroit, while Michilimackinac merchants 
expanded their sources of credit.33  In 1778, David McCrue, John Kay, Peter 
Barthe, and Charles Gratiot, merchant partners at that ―Gibraltar of the 
North,‖ agreed to pay six percent interest on funds and trade goods provided 
by William and John Kay of Montreal.34  But the good times were cut short 
when Governor-General Guy Carleton enacted a law allowing only vessels in 
the ―service of the Crown to navigate the Great Lakes,‖ thus reducing the 
trade volume between the St. Lawrence River and the western frontier for 
the remainder of the American Revolution.35 Carleton’s actions forced many 
merchants to divert pelts from Michilimackinac and Detroit to St. Louis and 
New Orleans.   
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With that influx of English goods, French St. Louisans were able to 
increase their gifts, and thus their influence, with the dozens of tribal 
delegations that visited the town each year.  Many merchants in the British 
zone of the Illinois Country, like Gratiot and Key, relocated their business to 
the ―Spanish side‖ at St. Louis in the late 1770s in order to enjoy 
uninterrupted trade while war raged in the East.  Others, however, chose to 
pursue illegal trade along the Missouri River. Jean-Marie Ducharme, a rogue 
trader from Montreal, lost $4,000 to $5,000 worth of merchandise and furs 
when Laclede and a St. Louis posse captured his boats.36 
Free of the fear of an imminent British invasion by the removal of 
their troops, and largely free of interference from Spanish officials in New 
Orleans, who were now engaged in war with England along the Gulf Coast, 
St. Louis appeared to be the rock of stability and consistency in the West.  
Retaining some political influence over Cahokia, Kaskaskia, and Vincennes, 
the British were committed to keeping the Indians at least neutral, and if 
possible, to gain them as allies.  They recognized that it would have been 
―impossible to keep the Indians out of the fight,‖ but ―surely the presents [the 
Indians] receive will prevent their acting against us.‖37  While the British and 
Spanish empires across the Mississippi River from one another tried to 
maintain a status quo of non-violence, the most de-stabilizing element came 
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from the American colonists, who sought to stake their claim in the Illinois 
Country.  From the opening of the war, the Continental Congress 
contemplated expeditions against the British forts at Niagara and Detroit, 
which were not feasible because of the government’s limited capital and 
military capabilities.38  The Virginians, however, were ready to act on their 
own. 
Aware of their ancient royal charter that gave them ―sea to sea‖ 
boundaries, and motivated by an immediate desire for land and fur profits, 
Virginians grabbed the initiative in conquering the Illinois Country under the 
guise of furthering the American Revolution.  Governors Patrick Henry and 
Thomas Jefferson successively supported General George Rogers Clark and 
his ―Illinois Regiment‖ of Virginia ―Long Knives‖ in attacking Britain’s 
vulnerable old French villages along the Mississippi River.  Clark’s small 
frontier army surprised the residents of Kaskaskia on July 4, 1778.  He 
divided his ―little Army into two Divisions [and] ordered one to surround the 
Town,‖ while the other ―broke into the Fort, secured the Governour . . . [and] 
in 15 minutes had every Street Secured.‖  He then ―sent Runners through the 
Town, ordering the People on the pane of Death to keep Close to their 
Houses, which they observ’d, and before daylight had the whole disarmed.‖39 
Clark went on to capture Cahokia, Prairie du Rocher, and Vincennes by mid-
August, but his ultimate objective was Detroit, which would have inflicted 
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severe economic and military damage to England’s cause in both theaters of 
war.40 
Clark’s sudden attacks and easy victories forced an urgent British 
reappraisal of how they could hold—or regain—control over the Illinois 
Country and the role it might play in their war strategy.  Uncertainty about   
Clark’s objectives and the ―route the rebels would take next‖ thrust the 
―whole country in the Greatest Confusion.‖ British merchants feared that the 
Virginians could now ―plunder‖ their trade goods and ruin them financially.41  
Since the fur trade was vital for funding the war and securing Indian allies 
on the frontier, St. Louis and the Americans were aligned in a common cause 
against both the mercantile and military assets of Great Britain.  On a 
national level, France and Spain would soon be official allies of the United 
States while Governor Galvez in New Orleans was preparing for aggressive 
campaigns against the British throughout the Gulf of Mexico.  Funds from 
Virginia purchased supplies in that southern capital and were sent up the 
Mississippi to a ―Continental [Army] Store at St. Louis,‖ which supplied 
Clark’s men encamped across the river with knives, ammunition, food, wine, 
and brandy.42 On a personal level, General Clark found a trusted friend in 
Commandant de Leyba.  He was a ―gentlemen [who] interested himself much 
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in favor of the States‖ and even offered to send militiamen to help hold 
Clark’s conquests in Illinois.    
But St. Louisans were making a ―deal with the devil‖ that would have 
immediate and long-range consequences.  Could they afford to challenge 
Great Britain so openly?  As an English commandant wrote to Governor 
Galvez, the St. Louisans had committed a most serious ―impropriety‖ by 
―affording an Asylum to Rebels‖ who were ―then in Arms against their 
sovereign‖ and providing ―supplies of gun powder and other stores.‖ Poaching 
Illinois furs was one thing, but the French Creoles across the river should 
think twice about engaging in war with the redcoats.  The moment of decision 
was at hand for choosing ―how they are to act—whether as friends or 
Enemies to the British Empire.‖43  Secondly, would the long-term future of 
St. Louis be better with the Americans or the British in control of the Illinois 
Country?  Clark’s expeditions unleashed a torrent of American settlers 
flooding the ―empty countryside‖ along the Mississippi River.  Real estate 
speculators formed land companies almost overnight and began encouraging 
immigration by offering ―Chief Settlers or Heads of Families‖ who came to 
Illinois ―Five hundred of said Lotts free from purchase Money or rent,‖ with 
each ―Lott‖ consisting of 100 acres.44  The western expansion of the United 
States was now in full swing. 
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Before St. Louisans had time to assess the future, they found 
themselves in the cross-hairs of a British military offensive.  In December 
1778, Henry Hamilton, lieutenant governor of Detroit, recaptured Vincennes 
before losing it, again, to Clark’s forces.  The Virginians sent Hamilton to 
imprisonment in Williamsburg like a common criminal, because he had done 
the unthinkable—paying Indian ―savages‖ to kill and scalp whites.  Frederick 
Haldimand, governor-general of the newly expanded Quebec Province, had 
originally suspended British trade in the Illinois Country, but that only 
depressed the economies of Michilimackinac and Detroit as well as alienated 
Indian allies.45   In order to maintain Native allegiance, which was vital, 
given the lack of British troops, the Crown assumed the ―considerable 
additional Expence‖ of providing Indians with provisions.  At Detroit, Major 
Arent de Peyster distributed gunpowder and clothing to Sioux, Winnebago, 
and Menominee warriors because it was of the ―greatest importance to Secure 
these people in our interest before the Rebels make any impression on 
them.‖46 Indians were the ―only Barrier‖ against American, French, and 
Spanish assaults on territory and trade, but using them in battle had ethical 
implications in the context of ―civilized‖ European warfare.  Atrocities would 
almost certainly occur, but the British were determined to utterly destroy the 
―crops and the habitation of all the advanced Settlers‖ in the Illinois Country. 
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The British counteroffensive was timed to deal with two issues that 
weakened their position south of the Great Lakes.  One was international, 
since the dynamics of the American Revolution changed in the spring of 1779, 
when Spain signed the Treaty of Aranjuez with France and then joined the 
French in declaring war on Great Britain.47  Spain’s entrance into the war 
thrust the Illinois Country into the middle of a global contest for continental 
control of territory, trade, and the Indians that were central to both.  The 
second catalyst was more local and immediate, since Clark was planning to 
build a fort at the mouth of the Ohio River to help stabilize the American 
presence in the Illinois Country.  It would ―immediately become the Key of 
the Whole Trade of the Western Country‖ by supporting American fur traders 
and protecting navigation from British attacks along both the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers.48   
In June 1779, Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, ordered Governor Haldimand of Quebec to attack the Illinois 
Country with the goal of eventually capturing New Orleans.49  The British 
plan, proposed by Major de Peyster of Detroit, called for the Wabash Indians 
to attack Clark while he was preoccupied with building his new fort.  Sinclair 
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at Michilimackinac would coordinate Sioux, Winnebago, and Menominee war 
parties in a southern advance to capture Vincennes, Cahokia, Kaskaskia, and 
cross the Mississippi ―as if going to war against the Osages of the Missourie, 
and thereby surprise‖ the St. Louisans.50 
Sinclair succeeded in convincing his forces, both white and Indian, that 
this was a trade war.  Experienced British fur traders would command 
Native warriors they knew well, and everyone would share in the booty taken 
in the Illinois Country and at St. Louis.  Sinclair counted on Wabasha, a chief 
of ―very singular and uncommon abilities,‖ and his Dakota/Minnesota Sioux, 
who were a ―warlike people undebauched.‖ Two British Indian agents, Joseph 
Rocque and John Key, were assigned to Wabasha as interpreters and 
commissaries.  The other major Indian components were Ottawas under chief 
Matchekewis, as well as Winnebagos, Potawatomies, Sauks, Foxes, Iowas, 
Mascoutins, and Kickapoos.  Commanding those warriors were two veterans 
of the French and Indian War—Charles Michel de Langlade, who had fought 
for France, and Emanuel Hesse, a veteran of an American regiment serving 
the British.  To aid in convincing the uncertain Sauk and Fox to do their 
duty, Sinclair also assigned two fur traders, Jean-Marie Ducharme (whose 
trade Laclede had ruined) and Joseph Calve.51 
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In February, Sinclair began outfitting the expedition by ordering Hesse 
to ―collect all the Canoes and Corn in the country,‖ and gather his forces at 
Prairie du Chien at the junction of the Wisconsin and Mississippi rivers.  
Sinclair sent out ―nine large Belts‖ to various tribes depicting ―two Indian 
figures with joined hands & raised axes in the Country‖ between 
Michilimackinac and the Mississippi River.  All of the Indian auxiliaries were 
to meet Hesse at Prairie du Chien and not proceed down the Mississippi until 
Sergeant J. F. Phillips arrived with the order to march. The first target of the 
invasion was St. Louis because of its reportedly inadequate defenses 
consisting of ―only 20 men & 20 brass Cannon.‖  If the capture of St. Louis 
proved successful, Hesse was to remain there while Wabasha attacked 
―Misere [Ste. Genevieve] and the Rebels at Kacasia [Kaskaskia].‖ Once those 
sites were under their control, the British would have adequate supplies and 
food for launching an attack against New Orleans.52 
While Sinclair was coordinating the resources for his expedition, Clark 
suspected that the British were up to something.  ―I make no doubt,‖ he 
remarked, ―of the English Regaining the Interest of many Tribes of Indians 
and their designs against the Illinois‖ Country considering the ―Immence 
quantity of goods‖ the British possessed.  Because ―bad Crops and the 
severity of the Winter hath Rendered it Impossible‖ for towns in the Illinois 
Country ―to make any further supplies until next Harvest,‖ Clark was 
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inclined to ―Amediately Evacuate our present posts, and let our whole force 
Center at or near the Mouth of Ohio.‖  Clark thought it best to pull back and 
reorganize his forces so ―in a few months‖ they could ―act again on the 
offensive.‖53  But events moved quickly, and most of his forces were still at 
Cahokia when the British struck. 
Believing that he possessed the element of surprise, Hesse headed 
downriver from Prairie du Chien on May 2, 1780, with some 750 men, 
―including Traders, servants and Indians.‖  But several informants were 
tracking his movements.  In late March, trader John Conn warned St. 
Louisans of an impending British attack.54  Because the town was 
―exposed…on all sides to the enemy without defense,‖ Lieutenant Governor 
de Leyba planned for four stone towers to be constructed, but only the west 
tower, which  ―dominate[d] the major part of the village,‖ was completed in 
time.55  Leyba also ordered the dilapidated Fort San Carlos at the mouth of 
the Missouri River to be blown up so the enemy could not use it, while 
transferring its six soldiers and five cannon to St. Louis.  Due to the ―extreme 
poverty and misery to which the inhabitants have been reduced,‖ Leyba 
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forced the town’s affluent merchants to pay for most of the defensive 
preparations.56 
 With St. Louis having but ―a few troops and inhabitants,‖ Leyba sent a 
dispatch on May 9 to Ste. Genevieve, calling for support.  Silvio Francisco de 
Cartabona, commander of the small Spanish garrison there, and Francois 
Vallé, captain of the town’s militia, responded to Leyba’s plea for help by 
sending thirty men.  On May 13, Leyba also called in all the hunters and 
trappers scattered within twenty leagues of St. Louis.  Within five days of his 
initial orders, Leyba had an additional 150 men—―all good shots‖—to help 
finalize his preparations.57 
 Leyba took the initiative and sent out scouting parties to spot the 
enemy.  He ordered two separate detachments, one with ―forty men in three 
pirogues . . . as far as ten to twelve leagues‖ up the Mississippi River.  The 
other group was sent upriver in two canoes with orders not to return until 
they ―might see the army of the enemy.‖  Meanwhile, Leyba ordered the 
inhabitants to dig two ―Intrenchments‖ at each end of the village, both 
starting at the Mississippi and ending at the tower.  In addition, he had a 
floor constructed in the tower and positioned all five cannon there, until it 
resembled ―a platform Cannon with a Parapet thrown over a Stone House.‖ 58 
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 When the attackers finally appeared before St. Louis on May 26, 
residents had been expecting them for three days.  Approaching the town 
from the north, the Indians divided their forces and ―scattered in the fields, 
massacring with all possible fury and barbarity the farmer and his animals.‖  
The larger half stormed the fortifications and ―advanced like madmen, with 
an unbelievable boldness and fury, making terrible cries and a terrible 
firing.‖  The speed of the warriors’ assault and their loud war whoops struck 
terror into the inhabitants of St. Louis.  The ―lamentable cries‖ of the women 
and children were heard above the musket and artillery fire.59 
 During the exchange of hot lead between the defenders in the trenches 
and the charging Indians, Leyba and six other men hurried to the tower and 
started firing the cannon in the general direction of the enemy.  Those 
booming blasts shocked the Indians, who did not believe that St. Louis had 
artillery, and prevented warriors from concentrating an attack on the weakly 
defended trenches.  As a result, the Indians began to fall back and instead 
focused merely on ―massacring several persons working in the fields who had 
not had sufficient time to take refuge‖ behind the trenches.60  Most of the 
carnage occurred among civilians caught in the open, who were butchered 
along with ―oxen, cows, horses, pigs, and hens.‖  Witnesses reported the 
gruesome sight of friends and family members inflicted with ―the most 
unheard [kind] of barbarity‖—―scalped, entrails opened, craniums crushed, 
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limbs mutilated, bathed in blood, and scattered here and there.‖  The Indians 
intentionally committed such atrocities in plain sight ―in order to draw the 
Spaniards from such parts of the works as afforded them cover,‖ but their 
attempts failed to pull anyone away from the safety of the trenches.61   
After five hours of fighting, the Indians finally withdrew and retreated 
toward the mouth of the Illinois River.  They left in their wake 21 dead, 7 
wounded, and 25 captured St. Louisans.62  The town was on high alert for the 
next several weeks, as Leyba was expecting Langlade to come down the 
Illinois River ―with an army of savages to pounce . . . a second time.‖  But 
Langlade’s men were harassed by Spain’s Potawatomi allies, creating enough  
―dissension between the commanders of the party‖ to force the ―abandonment 
of the plan.‖63 
Although St. Louisans were on edge for weeks, expecting to be 
attacked ―daily by the savages who have alarmed us so much,‖ Leyba agreed 
to furnish ―one hundred Men With Botes arms Artilerey Amonition & 
provision‖ to help hunt down the attackers.  The St. Louis contingent under 
the trained French officer, Pierre Picote de Belestre, joined American troops 
under Colonel John Montgomery of Clark’s army at Cahokia on June 14.  The 
joint force was slow in forming and moving northward, and finding no 
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Indians to fight, and returned after ―burning a [Sauk] Town which had been 
Evacuated some days.‖64 
During Montgomery’s expedition, fragments of Hesse’s forces trickled 
into Detroit and Michilimackinac and reported on their defeat.  British 
officials could not believe that the small villages of St. Louis and Cahokia had 
prevailed, and they blamed the failed attack on leaked information, obviously 
given the time the Spanish had to construct a stone tower and trenches.  
Officials also pointed fingers at Calve and Ducharme and their Sauk and Fox 
warriors, who had ―fallen back so early,‖ which prevented Wabasha’s Sioux 
and the Winnebagos from ―storm[ing] the Spanish Lines.‖ The Sauks and 
Foxes had always been reluctant to attack St. Louisans, with whom they had 
long traded, but Sinclair blamed those traders of being distracted by a ―little 
underhand commerce‖ instead of conquering St. Louis, which would have 
given them the entire ―Trade of the Missouri [River Valley].‖  In reality, 
Sinclair was in no position to share the wealth of the West with such 
disreputable frontier traders.  The British were so strapped for resources that 
they could not spare regular troops for the St. Louis campaign, and Sinclair 
had planned all along to ship captured merchandise to Michilimackinac.65   
 The British had no monopoly on disingenuousness, for when the old 
and ailing Leyba died on June 28, much of the Spain’s friendly cooperation 
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with the Americans died too.  Leyba’s replacement, Lieutenant Governor 
Francisco Cruzat, who had held that position before, expressed his wariness 
of American intentions.  ―I cannot,‖ he said, ―cease to keep my eye open in 
regard to the movements and . . . ideas of my neighbors, the Americans.‖66 
 Far upriver, along the shore of Lake Michigan, the skepticism and 
apprehension of British officials, regarding their ―allies,‖ was growing.  The 
shocking news of their defeat at St. Louis only heightened British paranoia 
about the influence of French families over the Indians in the Illinois 
Country.  In the months following their defeat, the emotional British lashed 
out against those French families whom they suspected of treason.    
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Chapter 3 
The Kinship Raids on Fort St. Joseph, 1780-1781 
 
   
Most historians have interpreted the 1780-81 St. Louis attacks on Fort 
St. Joseph as part of Spain’s efforts to incite an Indian war between tribes in 
the region, or to lay claim to the Great Lakes for leverage at the treaty table 
when the American Revolution was over.67  But a stronger case can be made 
that the French St. Louis militiamen who risked their lives in two raids on 
that British fort did so to retaliate for the rough treatment of relatives and to 
retrieve personal property and other booty. The Fort St. Joseph raids 
revealed the vibrant French family networks in the Illinois Country, 
demonstrating the active role that the area’s original European residents 
continued to play in the political, economic, and military destiny of the 
region. 
 Fort St. Joseph was constructed near the southeastern shore of Lake 
Michigan by Robert, Sieur de LaSalle in 1679 to protect France’s fur trade in 
the Illinois Country.  The French built several forts along the Illinois River 
watershed, but Fort St. Joseph helped defend a particularly strategic site—
the key portaging areas near the confluence of the St. Joseph and Kankakee 
rivers.  For several generations after LaSalle, the Michigan Potawatomi and 
Miami Indians visited and traded with the French at Fort St. Joseph.  
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Multicultural mating between the Indians and the French created a truly 
mixed society in that ―Middle Ground‖ region and produced a unique kinship 
system that prospered by peaceful interactions.  As cultural beliefs and 
knowledge were exchanged, separating ―Frenchness‖ from ―Indianness‖ 
became difficult.  Historians have long misunderstood the cultural evolution 
occurring in areas such as the St. Joseph River Valley by assuming that 
Indians were assimilating to European civilization.  On the contrary, it was 
the French who were strangers in the lands of Indian sovereigns and had to 
adopt behavior conducive to productive trading.  The French had to ―modify 
their own cultural practices and redefine their identities‖ to be accepted by 
the Indians, not the other way around.68 
 Throughout the first half of the 18th century, the French and Indian 
community thrived in the St. Joseph area, alive with foot and boat traffic 
between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River.  The furs were plentiful 
and the soil enriched by frequent flooding.  In the Indian villages, women did 
the farming while men hunted, trapped, and traveled.  Combining French 
technology with Native traditions created a hybrid agriculture that produced 
increased harvests of grain crops due to the use of oxen-pulled European 
plows and hay carts for feeding dairy cows.  Many homesteads—whether a 
French-style poteaux en terre building, a frontier log cabin, or an Indian 
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longhouse—also had chickens, pigs, and fruit orchards.  A surplus of food 
supported transient traders and voyageurs who made the village a regular 
stop on their travels.  The wealth from pelts provided imported merchandise, 
and as a supplement to agriculture, enhanced ―the stability of the region.‖69 
  The congenial French and Indian world at Fort St. Joseph would 
never be the same after the area was ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of 
Paris in 1763.   When the British assumed control, the French and Indians 
were reluctant to trust their authority.  There was an increased level of 
paranoia rooted in the centuries-old dynastic and religious rivalries between 
Great Britain and France.  The British felt that the French were to blame for 
all of their difficulties with the Indians and considered them commercial 
rivals in the fur trade.  But the British failed to realize that their diplomatic 
and trade policies had long alienated Indians by showing little respect for 
Native traditions and territories.  Unlike the British, the French were able to 
maintain their friendship with Indians through kinship.  As blood relatives, 
the French and Indians facilitated respectful commodity exchanges based on 
trust and gift-giving.  However, when the British took over, they disrespected 
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the Indians by reducing the volume and value of diplomatic presents and 
confused alienating military coercion with willing commercial alliance.70 
Despite the distrust of their traditional foes, the British tried to exploit 
the special connection between the French and the Indians to help the fur 
trade prosper.  A British commandant at Detroit noted that ―the French 
Inhabitants and Indians are soe much connected that if you disoblige one of 
them, the other takes Part.‖71  The British faced a conundrum: either trust 
their ancient enemies with valuable merchandise, or face incredible financial 
loss from a failed fur trade.  Realizing the French had ―great influence with 
the Indians,‖ the British had no other choice—for the moment—but to use the 
French to stimulate trade.72  
By the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Fort St. Joseph possessed 
only a fraction of the population that had resided there in the early 18th 
century.  Many French families had moved in order to pursue better economic 
opportunities at a greater distance from British authorities.  However, Louis 
and Marie Chevalier remained there, continuing to trade and influence 
affairs as the leading family in the community, including their relatives 
among the St. Joseph Potawatomies.  In 1777 the Michilimackinac 
commandant, Major Arent de Peyster, observed that Louis Chevalier was ―so 
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connected with Pottawatamies that he can now do anything with them, 
having lived upwards of thirty years‖ with them.73   
De Peyster was so impressed by ―that Gentleman‖ Chevalier’s 
relationship with the Indians, he appointed Louis the liaison between the 
British and the Potawatomies at Fort St. Joseph. He ordered Chevalier to  
―give the first in Intelligence of the Enemy’s motions on the Wabash‖ to 
prevent a surprise attack by the Americans, since Fort St. Joseph was the 
―pass to Detroit.‖74  But not all British officials liked Chevalier. Governor 
Hamilton had not ―the least [bit of] confidence in him‖ because Chevalier was 
suspected of the ―assassination of several [British] traders at St. Joseph‖ in 
1773.  ―Whenever the means are in my hands to root out Mr. Chevalier,‖ 
Hamilton wrote, ―I shall not let an opportunity slip by.‖75 
Although there were many suspicions of Chevalier, British officials 
were in no position to remove him because of his ability to work with the 
Potawatomies.  Their relationship with Chevalier had paid dividends when 
Clark invaded Kaskaskia in 1778, because he notified de Peyster that the 
―rebels were in possession‖ of the Illinois Country.  Chevalier also informed 
the British that ―some Spaniards were at a conference between some of the 
Indians from St. Joseph and the Rebels at Kaskaskia.‖  Chevalier reassured 
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the British that the Potawatomies were still faithful to them, although the 
―bad hearts of the Rebels had corrupted some of the other tribes.‖ 
Louis Chevalier’s talents placed Fort St. Joseph in the forefront of all 
political and economic operations in the Illinois Country, and although he 
promoted peaceful trading, he remained ambivalent about British military 
aims.76  When Hamilton began mobilizing Indian forces to recapture 
Vincennes from the Virginians in the fall of 1778, Chevalier was requested to 
gather Potawatomi warriors as auxiliary troops.  When Chevalier claimed 
that he was unable to ―evaluate the situation‖ with the Potawatomies, an 
angry de Peyster sent a British trader and interpreter to order those Indians 
into action, as well as to spy on the French villagers.  Finally ―reconcil[ing] 
his Worship with his Duty,‖ Chevalier reported to Hamilton with fifteen 
Potawatomi warriors, who only came to protect him.77  That was seen as an 
act of good faith by Hamilton, so that ―his future behavior may efface his 
former misbehavior.‖  But Chevalier and the Potawatomies’ left Vincennes a 
month before Clark attacked and recaptured the town.78 
  Chevalier continued to provide intelligence to the British, and his 
report that the ―rebels have employ’d the [French] to purchase horses to 
mount their Cavalry in the neighborhood of Chicagou‖ was particularly 
                                                 
76
 Sleeper-Smith, “Female Kin Networks,” 60. 
77
 Letter of Major De Peyster to General Haldimand, Sept. 21, 1778; Letter of Major De Peyster to General 
Haldimand, Oct. 27, 1778; Correspondence of Lieut. Gov. Hamilton to General Haldimand, Sept. 25, 1778, 
in Seineke, Clark Adventure, 291, 299, 310. 
78
 Letter of Lieut. Gov. Hamilton to General Haldimand, Nov. 1, 1778; Letter of Major De Peyster to 
General Haldimand, Mar. 29, 1779, in Seineke, Clark Adventure, 329, 330, 366. 
Stuckey 39 
upsetting to de Peyster.79  Additional information noted that Clark was going 
to attack Detroit with 700 men by way of the Wabash and 400 cavalry 
through Fort St. Joseph.  De Peyster immediately dispatched a detachment of 
20 soldiers, 60 traders, and 200 Indians under Lieutenant Thomas Bennett of 
the 8th Regiment of Foot, stationed at Michilimackinac, to intercept that 
force.  Bennett placed most of his force at Fort St. Joseph, and sent scouting 
parties out in every direction in an attempt to locate the invaders, but finding 
no confirmation of the rumored attack, he headed back to Detroit while 
leaving a significant supply of goods at the fort under the safe keeping of 
Chevalier.80  Clark heard about those large stores at Fort St. Joseph and 
made plans for a September attack, but the expedition never materialized 
because his ―men complained that they had no shoes and would not go to St. 
Josephs.‖81 
The British, however, were well on the way to launching their invasion 
of St. Louis and Cahokia.  Enough rumors were flying in all directions that 
Lieutenant Governor Patrick Sinclair of Michilimackinac suspected that the 
French along the lakes were leaking information to their relatives along the 
Mississippi River Valley.82  He specifically suspected the Chevalier family of 
sending word to their St. Louis kin, because of the frequency of ―Letters from 
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Pencour [St. Louis] and St. Joseph’s.‖  Sinclair believed that ―Mr. Chevallier 
will certainly endeavour to introduce a French or Rebel party at St. Joseph’s 
if our movements do take place before Autumn,‖ and he proposed that a 
―Captain of Militia [be sent] to St. Joseph’s‖ to be a ―guard there.‖83  Sinclair’s 
suspicions only grew stronger after he learned the shocking news of the 
British defeat at St. Louis.  Enraged, he blamed the failed offensive 
specifically on the French fur traders who had abandoned the expedition and, 
in general, on any French families who had either sent or received 
information about the ―surprise‖ attack.   
General Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief of the British North 
American forces, remarked that ―it would be best to rout those villains [the 
French] out of all the small posts‖ so British influence could grow.84  
Haldimand declared that French inhabitants were the ―most dangerous 
Enemies,‖ and if any suspicions of disloyalty arose, they were to be ―Seized‖ 
from their homes and sent to Quebec ―in Irons.‖85  In August 1780, Sinclair 
manipulated the situation to satisfy his own vengeance by deporting the 
Chevaliers and fourteen other French Fort St. Joseph families not to Quebec 
or Montreal as ordered, but to his post at Michilimackinac.  Louis Joseph 
Ainsse, Louis Chevalier’s nephew, was commanded to ―bring in the Crew 
through favor and compulsion.‖  Arriving with six canoes and leaving with 
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fifteen families, Ainsse recorded a census of the inhabitants and then 
escorted his kin from their home.  During his forced exodus from Fort St. 
Joseph, Chevalier petitioned Haldimand about his unfair treatment and 
requested reimbursement for the property he left behind, which included ―ten 
houses, good lands, orchards, gardens, cattle, [and] furniture.‖86  
The deportation of the Chevaliers backfired in dramatic fashion. 
Without their French friends nearby, the Potawatomies protested to de 
Peyster, demanding the ―reason why all their Traders were forced from 
them.‖  He responded by claiming that he ―will not withhold Traders from 
them, tho’ he may not think proper to send the same [ones] back.‖87  Shortly 
afterwards, British traders arrived at Fort St. Joseph to try to win over the 
Indians, but the Potawatomies were discontent with the loss of their ―French 
Fathers,‖ and ignored them.  An irate Haldimand lashed out and said that 
the Potawatomies ―must be informed that whatever changes are made by my 
direction and calculated as well for their happiness and prosperity as for the 
good of the King’s service.‖  Additionally, Haldimand remarked that the 
Potawatomies needed to prove their loyalty because they ―have had but the 
slight pretentions to [British] Protection.‖  By that point in the war, the 
British were especially strapped for funding, and to satisfy every Indian 
demand would have emptied the Crown’s already diminished treasury.  
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Haldimand realized that the St. Joseph Potawatomies ―wish to protract the 
War‖ to extort as many presents as possible.  So when the Potawatomies 
demanded explanations for Haldimand’s actions, he became angry, and 
ordered Sinclair and de Peyster to ―mutually inform each other of what 
passes,‖ and devise a plan to ―regulate their conduct.‖88   
By fall of 1780, the Illinois Country was more unstable than ever, and 
many tribes, such as the Milwaukee Potawatomies, Sauks, and Foxes, were 
shunning British traders.  Reports were being sent to Sinclair and de Peyster 
that Indians were ―not behaving in a proper manner,‖ with many having 
―taken up the Hatchet against [the British].‖  Around Fort St. Joseph, the 
Potawatomies had almost completely cut off trade with British, hindering 
attempts to control their community.89  Furthermore, rumors were 
circulating that a French colonel was organizing volunteers for an expedition 
against Detroit.  Augustin Mottin de la Balme, the rumored colonel, arrived 
at Vincennes in late August, and was warmly received by the inhabitants.  La 
Balme had come from France to fight the British, serving as a cavalry 
inspector for the Continental Congress on the east coast from 1777-1778 until 
he proposed to attack Canada from Detroit.  Congress acknowledged La 
Balme’s plan, but was unable to support him with troops and supplies.  As a 
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result, La Balme left the Atlantic coast and headed towards the Illinois 
Country to recruit an army on his own.90   
When La Balme arrived in Vincennes, he spoke of a large French army 
coming in the spring to ―drive both the Americans and English out of the 
Country.‖  He sent out war belts to the ―Shawnee and other Nations‖ to solicit 
their support for the restoration of their ―French Fathers.‖91  Many French 
and Indian residents supported La Balme’s plan to sack Detroit and expel the 
British, Spanish, and Virginians from the region.  The inhabitants of 
Vincennes rallied to his cause, while supplies were shipped from Cahokia and 
Kaskaskia.92  La Balme excited the French people to rally volunteers and 
fund the expedition while he used the ―French Flag for protection against the 
badly intentioned Indians.‖93  He set out from Vincennes in late October, and 
arrived at Miamis Town on November 3.  La Balme and his motley crew 
raided the empty village and the British warehouse, facing no resistance 
because the Indians were out hunting.  Weighed down by ―100 horses laiden 
with supplies and gifts‖ for the Indians, La Balme set out for Vincennes.  The 
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Miami victims of his theft, however, quickly pursued and killed him and 
several of his men.94 
News of La Balme’s defeat sent shock waves throughout the Illinois 
Country, ―filling all of the settlements with general anxiety.‖  The Spanish in 
St. Louis believed that La Balme’s failure would antagonize the British to 
attack them again in the spring.  Lieutenant Governor Cruzat was convinced 
that St. Louis ―shall be attacked next year‖ by those ―tenacious and 
barbarous enemies.‖95  The people of Vincennes, in particular, were fearful 
that an immediate assault would come.  They petitioned Clark for protection 
and supplies because the expedition had ―thrown [the town] into a good deal 
of consternation, for there is a great scarcity of provisions and ammunition.‖96  
The British naturally interpreted La Balme’s defeat as a victory for their 
influence and intentions.  However, Haldimand was apprehensive that La 
Balme’s raid signaled the beginning of a larger offensive in northern Illinois, 
and to some extent, his fears were justified.97 
An attack did come—at Fort St. Joseph.  In December 1780, men from 
Cahokia, under the leadership of Jean Baptiste Hamelin, a fur trader, and 
Thomas Brady, sacked the fort while the Indians were out hunting.  They 
captured British traders and took fifty bales of goods before heading towards 
Chicago.  They were intercepted by Lieutenant Dagneaux Du Quindre, a 
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British officer stationed at Fort St. Joseph to keep an eye on the Indians, and 
several Potawatomies from that site.  Quindre and his men killed four, 
wounded two, and captured seven of Hamelin’s men, while scattering the 
rest.  When de Peyster heard of the treasonous raid by men from British 
controlled Cahokia, he called the Potawatomies to a council at Detroit to pay 
them ―merit for their loyalty‖ to the Crown.98 
Several weeks after Hamelin’s raid, another band of men picked up 
where he left off, making a more serious and large-scale assault on Fort St. 
Joseph on February 12, 1781.  Marching under the Spanish flag, Eugene 
Poure, Charles Tayon, and Louis Chevalier junior led a company of 65 men 
from St. Louis, Cahokia, Kaskaskia, plus 65 Indians, to attack Fort St. 
Joseph.  Commandant Cruzat of St. Louis authorized Poure’s expedition to 
demonstrate to his Milwaukee Potawatomi allies—Chief  Naquiguen and 
Chief Siggenake—Spain’s power to ―terrorize the surrounding nations‖ and to 
compel other Great Lakes nations to side with His Catholic Majesty.99  
Outfitted with guns, ammunition, and supplies from Cruzat, the small army 
of Frenchmen and Indians marched six hundred miles over tough terrain in 
harsh winter weather to punish the British for abusing their relatives.100  
When his force arrived at the fort on February 11, Poure negotiated an 
agreement with the Potawatomies to split half of the booty if they left his 
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men unmolested.  His speech to the Indians ―urged them to have confidence 
in their Spanish and French brothers and to eschew the evil English.‖  With 
the Indians standing aside and no British troops in proximity, the St. 
Louisans ransacked the empty fort and searched the houses of their relatives.  
During the plundering, Poure raised the Spanish flag to replace the British 
banner, which he later presented to Cruzat.  After retrieving everything of 
value and giving the Indians their share, the St. Louisans burned Fort St. 
Joseph to the ground and headed home. 101 
Shortly after Poure’s departure, Du Quindre returned and tried in vain 
to ―assemble a sufficient Body [of Indians] to pursue‖ the attackers. However, 
the Potawatomies were persistent in requiring a council with de Peyster at 
Detroit.102  When they finally met in March, de Peyster questioned their 
commitment to their ―British Father,‖ and wondered why they were unable to 
prevent the attack.  The Potawatomies responded that the attackers ―came to 
St. Josephs at a time that all the Indians were yet at their hunt, excepting a 
few young men who were not sufficient to oppose‖ the enemy force.  Upset 
with their dubious loyalty, de Peyster scolded the Potawatomies, telling them 
that the Virginians and the Spanish wanted their land, and would stop at 
nothing to obtain it.  Shortly after the start of the council, de Peyster realized 
that his reprimanding was useless since the Indians had accepted Spanish 
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gifts of ―bracelets and gorgets decorated with southwestern turquoise.‖103  
The British did not realize that the raids were not just attacks on their 
outpost, but also attempts to destroy their influence in the upper Illinois 
Country completely. 
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Sinclair’s ignorant and aggressive treatment of the French inhabitants 
of Fort St. Joseph reinforced the connection between kin, and within four 
months of their deportation, members of Chevalier’s family attacked the fort 
and captured the British merchandise stored there.  What Sinclair ignored 
was that Louis Chevalier and his wife, Marie Madeleine Reaume 
L’archeveque, had considerable influence with not just the Potawatomies, but 
also extensive family connections that stretched to Michilimackinac, Green 
Bay, Detroit, Montreal, Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and St. Louis.  And all French-
Americans, without a nation to call home, gave allegiance to blood ties, 
traditional customs, and a strong Catholic faith so that their unique culture 
could persevere in a British realm dominated by Protestants. 
 Historians have often interpreted the raids on Fort St. Joseph as a 
part of La Balme’s expedition or a defensive attack by Spanish officials to 
prevent another British invasion of St. Louis.  On the contrary, both 
Hamelin’s and Poure’s raids were family matters, similar to clan battles in 
Scotland.  Thus, the powerful, persistent kinship connections among French 
residents of St. Louis, Cahokia, Kaskaskia, and Fort St. Joseph explain both 
expeditions.  More research by expert genealogists and archival historians is 
needed to provide all of the details, but the following distribution of French 
relatives—especially documented militiamen—who lived at the sites most 
relevant for the 1780-1781 battles reveal striking patterns that are more 
than merely coincidental.  
Stuckey 50 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Fort St.
Joseph Kin
Non-Kin
Indians
Total Men
43 39 65 147
Fort St. 
Joseph Kin
Non-Kin Indians Total Men
 
Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of the total number of men for December 1780 and February 1781 Fort 
St. Joseph raids.  Indians comprised the majority of the participants (44 percent), while Fort St. Joseph kin 
(29 percent) and non-kin (27 percent) made up the rest of the raiders. 
 
The Fort St. Joseph family of Louis Thérèse Chevalier and Marie 
Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque was the most influential link of all.  Their 
son, Louis Chevalier junior of St. Louis, was born, baptized, and raised in the 
St. Joseph River Valley, becoming ―well versed in the language of the 
[Potawatomi] Indians‖ living around St. Joseph.  He served Spanish St. Louis 
as an Indian interpreter and was listed on the St. Louis militia roster for 
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1780 as a sub-lieutenant under Poure. It was he who translated Poure’s 
proposal to the Potawatomies to share the booty from the fort.104   
Louis Chevalier senior also had several siblings living near his son in 
St. Louis.  His sister, Marie Madeleine, married Jacques DuMay, and lived in 
Cahokia with her son, Jean Baptiste.  Another one of Chevalier’s sisters, 
Marie Joseph, also resided at Cahokia with her husband, Pierre Locat.  
Joseph Maurice Chevalier, Louis’ brother, had a home in Kaskaskia along 
with another sister, Marie Charlotte.  Marie Charlotte Chevalier married 
Antoine Deshetres and had two sons, Louis and Jean Baptiste.  The senior 
Chevalier’s brother, three brothers-in-law, and five nephews may have joined 
his interpreter son on Poure’s expedition to avenge the deportation of the 
family patriarch and to recover personal property. 105  
The large and widely dispersed L’archeveque clan of Chevalier’s wife 
also suggests linkages to the St. Joseph raids.  Augustin L’archeveque was a 
fur trader who married Marie Madeleine Reaume. They had six children, all 
of whom settled in various parts of Canada and the Illinois region.  Marie 
Joseph Esther L’archeveque, daughter of Augustin and Marie, lived her 
                                                 
104
 Roster of St. Louis Militia Companies in 1780, Dec. 22, 1780, in Houck, Spanish Regime, 1:185, 191, n. 
36; Houck, Missouri, 2:42-44; Webster, French St. Joseph, 125; Rev. George Pare and M. M. Quife, “The 
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223. 
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 John Francis McDermott, ed., Old Cahokia: A Narrative and Documents Illustrating the First Century 
of Its History (St. Louis: The St. Louis Historical Documents Foundation, 1949), 168; Clarence Walworth 
Alvord, ed., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, vol. II, Cahokia Records, 1778-1790 
(Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1907), 626 n. 32; Natalia Maree Belting, Kaskaskia 
Under the French Regime (New Orleans: Polyanthos, 1975), 118; Houck, Missouri, 2:191 n. 33, 67 n. 141; 
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entire adult life in Cahokia.  She and her first husband, Jacques Lamarche, 
had four children:  Etienne Joseph, Louis, Marie Joseph, and Angelique.  Her 
second marriage to Charles Le Boeuf dit Laflamme produced another son, 
Philippe, who was living in Cahokia in 1780-1781.  Marie’s third husband 
was Thomas Brady, the co-leader of the December 1780 raid.  Marie’s 
daughter, Angelique, married Joseph Giroux, and they were resided at 
Cahokia in the 1780s.  The other daughter, Marie Joseph, married Joseph 
Languedoc in 1772 and Louis Lecompte in 1775.  At least a few of those men 
would likely have joined Brady out of family pride.106 
Antoine St. Francois represented other St. Louis family ties to Fort St. 
Joseph. He married Charlotte L’archeveque, sister of Augustin and sister-in-
law to Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque, and one of his daughters, 
Marie Magdalen, married Gregoire Kiercereau, who was a member of a 
leading St. Louis family (formerly of Fort de Chartres) since 1764.  Francoise, 
Gregoire, and Gregoire’s brother, Paul, were all listed on the St. Louis militia 
roster in December 1780.  Gregoire and Paul Kiercereau’s sister, Reńee, 
married Louis Portier, who was also a member of the St. Louis militia.  One 
of the sub-lieutenants on that list, Charles Tayon, was the brother of Paul 
Kiercerau’s wife, Marie Joseph Michel dit Tayon, from another of St. Louis’s 
first families. In addition, Marie Catherine, Francois’ second daughter, 
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married Nicholas Lecomte, and he, along with his brother Guillermo and 
nephew Joseph, were all members of the St. Louis militia.107 
Several of Augustin’s siblings also resided at Fort de Chartres before 
moving to St. Louis.  Brother Francois wed Elizabeth Sorel at Fort de 
Chartres in 1750, and moved with their daughter Helene to St. Louis.  She 
eventually married Pierre Hubert Lacroix at St. Louis in 1767.  Elizabeth’s 
godchild was Elizabeth Martigny, daughter of Jean Baptiste Martigny, an 
officer of the French militia in Illinois prior to 1764 and a member of the St. 
Louis militia in 1780.108 
Antoine Beauvis married Marianne Viger and was godfather to Joseph 
Jutras, son of Marie Catherine Reaume L’archeveque.  Marie Catherine was 
one of the daughters of Augustin and Marie Reaume L’archeveque.  Beauvis 
was a magistrate in Kaskaskia during the 1780s.109 
Jean Baptiste Hamelin, one of the leaders of the December 1780 raid, 
had three sons (Ignace, Francois, and Joseph) and two brothers (Laurant and 
Francois) living in Cahokia during 1780-1781. He was connected with Fort 
St. Joseph through his sister, Agathe Hamelin Normand, who had two 
daughters and a son baptized at the St. Joseph’s Mission in 1768. Laurant 
Hamelin’s two sons, Louis and Joseph, also resided there at Cahokia when 
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the raids took place.  The Hamelin family could have sent as many as eight 
men on one or more of those expeditions.110 
Claude Caron was linked to Fort St. Joseph as a godparent to Marie 
Charlotte Longval, daughter of Jean Baptiste Francois Longval and Marie 
Amable L’archeveque—another daughter of Augustin and Marie Madeleine 
Reaume L’archeveque.  Caron owned farmland at Kaskaskia and sold his 
flour in St. Louis, where he and his two sons, Joseph and Jean Baptiste, 
served as militiamen in 1780.  Besides Jean Baptiste Francois Longval’s 
direct connection to Fort St. Joseph through his wife, Marie Amable 
L’archeveque, he was also the godfather of Felicite St. Germain, whose 
father, Pierre, also suffered deportation by the British.  Longval’s brother, 
Louis, lived in Kaskaskia, married Marie Louis La Course and fathered three 
sons: Polite, Louis, and Joseph.111  Jean and Marie Longval’s daughter, Marie 
Charlotte, married Louis Gaut and resided in Cahokia.  Their three sons, 
Louis, Joseph, and Jean Baptiste, may have participated in the raids.112 
Fur trader Jean-Baptiste Baron lived at Fort St. Joseph with his first 
wife but relocated to Fort de Chartres and married Domitilda Rolet.  Their 
four children were Joseph, Suzanne, Jean-Baptiste, and Gabriel—and the 
last three all were living at Cahokia in 1780-1781: Suzanne and her husband, 
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Joseph Clermont; Jean-Baptiste with his wife, Marie Poupard; and Gabriel 
with his wife, Marie Louise Buteau.113 
The St. Louis raids on Fort St. Joseph revealed the ability of 
generation-old French kin networks’ to impact international affairs in the 
Illinois Country, even a century after the French had first colonized the 
region.  The British committed a fatal mistake in bullying and deporting the 
influential Chevalier-L’archeveque family.  That forced removal, which was 
similar to the earlier British deportation of the French Acadians in the 1750s 
and 1760s, cost the English dearly.  The wrath of French relatives to the 
south, which resulted in two attacks in a three-month period, revealed the 
weakness of the British military, eroding Indian confidence and trust.  
The dismal financial state of the Crown further strained Indian relations 
because the flow of Indian gifts was inconsistent, and warriors were not 
interested in risking the safety of their villages without receiving 
merchandise in return.  Additionally, in late spring of 1781, rumors were 
circulating that Clark was planning an invasion of the Illinois country.  Panic 
and anxiety further destabilized the region, as British officials and Indians 
alike were fearful of the Virginians.  Reports that Clark was ―meditating 
some blow against the Upper Posts‖ caused the British to retract into a 
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defensive mindset and shift large quantities of supplies, intended for the 
Indians, to their warehouses at Michilimackinac and Detroit.114 
 With British authorities on full alert, trading throughout the region 
suffered.  Complaints of the incidents at Fort St. Joseph warranted the 
merchants’ concern about the lack of protection from the British military. 
Montreal merchants petitioned Haldimand to protect shipments going to 
Michilimackinac and Detroit, warning him that if he could not secure their 
merchandise, then the whole province would face a ―considerable loss‖ of 
some ―£30,000 sterling.‖  Haldimand responded that ―Troops being sent for 
the protection of one or a few Traders is out of the question‖ and they would 
have to go into the wilderness ―at their own risque [and] . . . take the 
consequence.‖115  Once it became clear that the British had no extra funds or 
troops for protection, their ability to control the Illinois Country was certainly 
at an end.116    
For the remainder of the Revolutionary War, constant rumors of 
invasion from British, Spanish, French, and/or Americans rippled through 
the Illinois Country, but none occurred, because few Indians could be found to 
do the fighting.117  The Native nations were caught in between the European 
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entities, and were apprehensive to join any side because no one group 
possessed sole control of the area.  Native neutrality frustrated all sides, but 
the British especially.  Indians constantly approached Sinclair and de Peyster 
with proposals to attack American and Spanish positions if they were 
supplied with the necessary provisions and incentives.  Since the Crown was 
practically broke, however, the ―vast expence of fitting [Indians] out would 
over Balance the advantage to be derived.‖118   
 By November 1782, a preliminary peace agreement had been reached 
between Great Britain and the American colonies, and all post commanders 
were ordered to cease military operations.  The initial treaty negotiations 
were a nightmare, as Spanish, French, British, and American diplomats 
disagreed over multiple boundaries and navigation rights on the Mississippi. 
The Revolution only ended officially when the Americans abandoned their 
French and Spanish allies and signed a separate treaty with their greatest 
enemy in 1783.  Once again, the contributions of the French were neither 
recognized nor rewarded, and even as a new nation, the Americans would 
maintain their Anglo attitude. 
                                                 
118
 General Haldimand to General Powell, June 23, 1781, in MPHS, 642. 
Stuckey 58 
Conclusion 
 
  
During the American Revolution, the Illinois Country occupied a 
pivotal position in the contest between European and Native forces fighting 
over the political sovereignty and economic resources of the region.  Two 
regional fur trade centers—St. Louis and Fort St. Joseph—became primary 
targets of attacks by multicultural forces because each controlled commerce 
and Indian alliances along strategic waterways. Most importantly, however, 
these two towns shared French cultural traditions—the same customs, 
language, and religion—as well as extensive interconnected bloodlines. 
Whether of European or métis ancestry, members of the same families lived 
in both places and valued kinship loyalty above all.  The French had been the 
original Europeans in the Illinois Country for generations, and they alone 
possessed the manpower and acculturated frontier talents as guides, traders, 
hunters, interpreters, Indian diplomats, and militiamen that all the major 
powers needed to succeed in that theater of war.  What the Spanish, British, 
and Americans all overlooked, however, were the extensive reach of a French 
kinship network that intersected, infiltrated, and often interfered with, 
national boundaries and imperial policies.  Those French men and women 
without a country who had been ―orphaned‖ by France in 1763 understood 
patriotism to mean loyalty to one’s own kin.   
 Previous histories have incompletely interpreted the influence of 
French kinships in the Revolutionary War.  Clark’s invasion in 1778-1779 
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was less bloody than other major campaigns of the war because the French 
families in Kaskaskia, Vincennes, and Cahokia only offered minimal 
resistance, while their relatives in St. Louis actually supported it.  Word of 
the British-Indian attack on St. Louis in May 1780 was transmitted through 
family networks between Michilimackinac and the Mississippi.  As a result, 
Spanish officials had time to prepare the defenses that helped save the town.  
And the most compelling reason to attack Fort St. Joseph in 1780-1781 was 
to correct the wrongs done by the British to family members there.  In those 
raids, Frenchmen asserted the vitality of their common and ancient roots in a 
homeland that now spread across the Illinois Country like so many branches.  
Pushed and pulled in many directions by all nations, French militiamen 
traveling to the village of relatives must have found those attacks cathartic. 
Genealogical research illustrates how the French maintained their 
special cultural identity through kinship networks despite geographical 
distance and political domination by foreigners.  The French had long 
persevered by clinging to their heritage and familial attachments, since none 
of the flags flying in the West was theirs.  As scholars expose the depth of 
French roots in the Illinois country, our understanding of how kin networks 
impacted political events in the region will become clearer.  Histories of 
events such as the Battle of St. Louis and the Fort St. Joseph raids will be 
considered from all perspectives, not just from an American or British point 
of view.  Genealogy has only recently become a valuable tool of most colonial 
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historians, but personal genetic factors long ignored may provide a new 
appreciation for the French, since they, too, have remained hidden by the 
tidal waves of great powers who forgot that blood was thicker than water.   
 
The End. 
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Appendix A 
Partial Baron Genealogy 
 
Jean Baptiste Baron = (1) Marie Catherine Sekioukoue119 
(a) Joseph Baron (1729 -?)120 
(b) Suzanne Baron (1730 -?) = Joseph Clermont 
(c) Marguerite Baron (1739-1758) 
 
             = (2) Domitilda Rolet 
(a) Joseph Marie Baron (1749 -?) 
(b) Jean Baptiste Baron (1751-?) 
(c) Gabriel Baron (1752-1789) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
Partial Hamelin Genealogy 
 
Jean Baptiste Hamelin  
(a) Ignace Hamelin 
(b) Francois Hamelin 
(c) Joseph Hamelin 
 
Agathe Hamelin121 = Joseph Normand  
   (a) Louis (1768-?) 
Louis Hamelin122 
 
Laurant Hamelin123 
(a) Louis Hamelin 
(b) Joseph Hamelin 
 
Francois Hamelin124 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- 
Partial St. Francois Genealogy 
 
Antoine St. Francois = Charlotte L’archeveque125 
(a) Marie Catherine St. Francois (1753-?) 
(b) Marie Magdelaine St. Francois (1755-?) 
 
(a) Marie Catherine St. Francois = Nicolas Lecompte (1738-?) 
(1) Marie Lecompte (1768-?) 
(2) Nicolas Lecompte (1770-?) 
(3) Louis (1772-?) 
 
(b) Marie Magdelaine St. Francois = Gregoire Kiercereau126 
                                                 
119 Godmother to Marie Catherine L’archeveque. Webster, 123. 
120 His godmother was Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque. Webster, 123. 
121 Jean Baptiste Hamelin’s sister. 
122 Jean Baptiste Hamelin’s brother, who was the godfather of Louis Normand. Webster, 203. 
123 Brother of Jean Baptiste Hamelin. 
124 Brother of Jean Baptiste Hamelin. 
125 Sister of Augustin L’archeveque.  Her godparents were Louis Paschal Chevalier and Angelique L’archeveque. 
Webster, 201. 
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Appendix B 
 
Partial L’archeveque Genealogy 
 
Augustin L’archeveque = Marie Madeleine Reaume (1711-?) 
(a) Marie Catherine L’archeveque (1731-?) 
(b) Marie Joseph Esther L’archeveque (1733-?) 
(c) Marie Anne L’archeveque (1738-?) 
(d) Marie Amable L’archeveque (1740-1793) 
(e) Angelique (Agathe) L’archeveque (1744-?) 
(f) Augustin L’archeveque (1746-?) 
 
(a) Marie Catherine L’archeveque = Jean Baptiste Jutras 
(1) Jean Baptiste Jutras (1761-?) 
(2) Joseph Jutras (1763-?)127 
(3) Marie Joseph Jutras (1768-?) 
 
(b) Marie Joseph Esther L’archeveque = (1) Jacques Bariso de La Marche 
(1) Etienne Joseph La Marche (1750-?) 
(2) Louis La Marche (1752-?) 
(3) Marie Joseph La Marche (1753-?) = Louis 
Lecompte 
(4) Angelique La Marche (1756-1790) = Joseph 
Giroux (1736-1786) 
 
= (2) Charles Le Boeuf dit Laflamme 
(5) Philippe Laflamme  
 
= (3) Thomas Brady 
 
(d) Marie Amable L’archeveque = Jean Baptiste Francois Longval128 
(1730-1790) 
(1) Marie Charolette Longval (1761-?) 
(2) Louis Longval 
(3) Polite 
(4) Josette 
(1) Marie Charolette Longval129 = Louis Gaut (?-1787) 
(i) Louis 
(ii) Joseph 
(iii) Jean Baptiste 
 
Louis Longval130 = Marie Louis La Course 
(a) Louis 
(b) Joseph 
                                                                                                                                                 
126 Gregoire Kiercereau’s brother, Paul, marries Marie Joseph Michel dit Tayon. 
127 His godfather was Antoine Beauvis. Webster, 188. 
128 Godfather to Felicite St. Germain.  Webster, 194. 
129 Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque was her godmother.  Claude Caron was her godfather.  Webster, 194. 
130 Brother of Jean Baptiste Francois Longval. 
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Appendix C 
 
Partial Chevalier Genealogy 
 
Jean Baptiste Chevalier = Marie Francoise Alavoine 
(a) Marie Charlotte Chevalier (1710-?) 
(b) Marie Anne Chevalier (1712-?) 
(c) Catherine Chevalier (1714, died 1714) 
(d) Michel Jean Baptiste Chevalier (1715-?) 
(e) Marie Joseph Chevalier (1718-?) 
(f) Constance Chevalier (1719-?) 
(g) Louis Thérèse Chevalier (1720-?) 
(h) Marguerite Josephe (1723-?) 
(i) Marie Madeleine Chevalier (1724-?) 
(j) Anne Charlotte Véronique Chevalier (1726-?) 
(k) Charles Chevalier (1727-?) 
(l) Joseph Maurice Chevalier (1728-?) 
(m) Louis Paschal Chevalier (1730-?) 
(n) Anne Thérèse Esther Chevalier (1732-?) 
(o) Angélique Chevalier (1733-?) 
(p) Luc Chevailer (1735-?) 
 
(a) Marie Charlotte Chevalier = Antoine Deshetres  
(1) Louis Deshetres (1731-?)131 
(2) Marie Catherine Deshetres (1732-?) 
(3) Marie Anne Deshetres (1734-?)132 
(4) Louis de Gronzague Deshetres (1736-?) 
(5) Antoine Hyacinthe Deshetres (1737-?) 
(6) Susanne Esther Deshetres (1743-?) 
(7) Jean Baptiste Deshetres (1745-?) 
 
(e) Marie Joseph Chevalier = Pierre Locat 
 
 (g) Louis Thérèse Chevalier = Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque 
     Louis Chevalier (1752-1801) 
 
(i) Marie Madeleine Chevalier = Jacques DuMay (?-1760) 
(1) Louis DuMay (1751-?)133 
(2) Louis DuMay (1753-?)134 
(3) Pierre DuMay (1755-?)135 
(4) Joseph DuMay (1756-?) 
(5) Marie Joseph DuMay (1757-?) 
(6) Elizabeth DuMay (1758-?) 
Jean Baptiste DuMay (1760-?) 
                                                 
131 Godmother was Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque. Webster, 127. 
132 Her godmother was Marie Anne Chevalier. Webster, 127. 
133 Louis Chevalier was his godfather. Webster, 199. 
134 Louis Paschal Chevalier and Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque were godparents. Webster, 199. 
135 Marie Anne L’archeveque was his godmother. Webster, 199. 
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Appendix D 
 
Partial Caron Genealogy 
 
Claude Caron (1714-?) = Charlotte Lachenais 
(a) Elizabeth Caron (1760-?) 
(b) Marie Joseph Caron (1761-?) 
Jean Baptiste Caron (1763-?) 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
All of the genealogical charts were created from information found in the 
following sources:  
 
Clarence Alvord’s Collections of the Illinois State Historical Society, 
Volume II: Virginia Series, Volume I: Cahokia Records, 1778- 
1790  
 
Clarence Alvord’s Collections of the Illinois State Historical Society, 
Volume V: Virginia Series, Volume II, Kaskaskia Records, 1778-1790.  
 
Louis Houck’s The Spanish regime in Missouri; a collection of papers 
and documents relating to upper Louisiana principally within the present 
limits of Missouri during the dominion of Spain, from the Archives of the 
Indies at Seville, etc., translated from the original Spanish into English, and 
including also some papers concerning the supposed grant to Col. George 
Morgan at the mouth of the Ohio, found in the Congressional library.   
 
John McDermott’s Old Cahokia: A Narrative and Documents 
Illustrating the First Century of Its History. 
 
Natalia Belting’s Kaskaskia Under the French Regime.  
 
Louis Houck’s A History of Missouri: From the Earliest Explorations 
and Settlements Until the Admission of the State into the Union. 
 
Susan Sleeper-Smith’s “Furs and Female Kin Networks: The World of 
Marie Madeleine Reaume L’archeveque Chevalier.”  New Faces of the Fur 
Trade: Selected Papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995. 
 
Susan Sleeper-Smith’s Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking 
Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes. 
 
Mildred Webster and Fred Krause’s French St. Joseph: Le Poste de la Rivière 
St. Joseph, 1690-1780.
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